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I. INTRODUCTION

L
ET and be integers satisfying . A -threshold scheme [3] , [17] is a system for sharing a piece of secret information, known as the secret, among a set of participants in such a way that the secret can be reconstructed from any shares, where a share is a private piece of information distributed securely by a trusted dealer to each participant on initial setup of the threshold scheme. The threshold structure is the collection of subsets of whose shares can collectively be used to reconstruct the secret, in other words All the threshold schemes discussed in this paper are perfect in the sense that knowledge of shares contributes no information to knowledge of the secret, and unconditionally secure in the sense that the security of the system does not depend on the difficulty of factorization, etc.
Threshold schemes are useful cryptographic primitives with many different applications. Examples include access control, protection of a cryptographic key, group signature protocols, and controlled key recovery. All these applications have in common the need to distribute trust in a secret parameter among a number of different entities. For more details of some applications see, for example, [19] .
There is a significant communication cost involved in setting up a -threshold scheme since the dealer must use secure channels to distribute each participant's share to them. There are many applications where such a one-off cost can be tolerated, but where it is not practical to assume the existence of such secure channels after the setup process has completed. For example, root cryptographic keys are often protected by threshold schemes where shares of the key are distributed manually to participants. This manual distribution process represents a temporary secure channel between the dealer and each participant that may not be practical to reactivate at a later date (the participants might be based in different countries, for example).
This raises the interesting question as to whether it is possible to make changes to the basic parameters of a -threshold scheme after the setup process has completed without having to use secure channels. Such a change may be required for a number of reasons: a set of participants might need to be removed from the scheme (disenrollment), involving a reduction in ; a set of participants might need to be added to the scheme (enrollment), involving an increase in ; the security policy relating to the threshold scheme might need to be strengthened (threshold increase), involving an increase in ; or slackened (threshold decrease), involving a decrease in ; or indeed any combination of the above.
An impractical solution to this problem would be for the dealer to distribute to each participant at setup not only a share in the original -threshold scheme, but also one share in every possible threshold scheme that might be required in the future. To change parameters it would suffice that the dealer use a public channel to broadcast a message instructing participants to start using the appropriate new shares. However, this solution generally requires each participant to store an excessive number of unnecessary shares.
It is, therefore, desirable to investigate threshold schemes where participants do not hold excessively large shares (we will be interested in them holding shares of minimal size), but where the dealer can still use a public channel to broadcast some information that enables the threshold scheme parameters to change. Each participant in the "new" threshold scheme can determine their share exclusively from the information that they received on system setup and the broadcast message. We assume that the dealer anticipates that a future parameter change may be necessary before issuing the initial shares. This allows the dealer to build the capability for parameter change into the threshold scheme at setup. Without this assumption 0018-9448/$20.00 © 2005 IEEE there are only a few types of parameter change that can be enabled using only broadcast channels (see Section VI).
The schemes that we look at will vary depending on the amount of knowledge that the dealer has about what future parameter changes will be needed. For reasons that we make clear in Section III, the following three cases are of particular interest.
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may decrease (but not by how much) and that some participants may need to be disenrolled (but does not know how many).
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may increase (but not by how much) and that some participants may need to be disenrolled (but does not know how many).
• The dealer anticipates that the threshold may change (but does not know whether it will increase or decrease) and that some participants may need to be disenrolled (but does not know how many).
Threshold schemes capable of changing their parameters within the same communications network context as this paper have been studied by a number of authors. A lower bound on the necessary share size to enable sequential disenrollment of participants in a threshold scheme was given in [4] . Both [4] and [15] demonstrated the optimality of this bound by providing different threshold schemes that met this lower share bound. In [5] , a framework was provided for studying this problem for secret sharing schemes (a generalization of threshold schemes) and the lower bound on share size proved in [4] was generalized for this environment.
We are interested in not just minimizing the share size, but also the necessary broadcast information to enable a change in the parameters of a threshold scheme. In [2] , a lower bound was shown for the amount of broadcast information necessary in the sequential disenrollment schemes of [4] , [15] . In this paper, we significantly extend this work by looking at general parameter changes for threshold schemes. In particular, we will provide lower bounds on the size of broadcast message necessary to enable any type of meaningful change to the parameters of a threshold scheme that already has minimal share size. The following is a simplified version of our main theorem (Theorem 15).
Theorem: Consider a -threshold scheme with on a participant set with a secret to be updated via a broadcast to , any -threshold access structure with secret on a subset of . Let be the associated broadcast. Suppose that each participant holds a share of minimal size (that is, We also show that these bounds are optimal by exhibiting schemes that meet these bounds.
Note that our communications environment differs from the one on which the redistribution techniques of [7] , [9] , [16] can be used to change the parameters of a threshold scheme. In redistribution environments there is no secure channel from the dealer to the participants to enable parameter change, but there do exist secure channels between the participants themselves. We make no such assumption here. The problem under discussion here is also related, but different, to the concept of proactive threshold schemes [10] , where broadcast messages are used to refresh shares, but not to change the parameters of the threshold scheme.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II, we introduce the necessary preliminary concepts about threshold schemes. In Section III, we present the model we use and discuss the methodology of the paper. In Section IV, we present some preliminary results using the model for dynamic threshold schemes. In Sections V-VII, we consider three different types of parameter change and establish lower bounds on the broadcast size for share-minimal threshold schemes enabling such changes to be made. We establish the optimality of these bounds in Section VIII by demonstrating optimal constructions of dynamic threshold schemes and present a small example to illustrate the construction. In Section IX, we discuss two possible avenues for further work. Appendix I contains the proofs of Theorems 12 and 14.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Since the threshold schemes that we discuss here are unconditionally secure (their security is independent of cryptographic assumptions on the strength of an adversary), we follow the popular convention (first proposed by [14] ) of modeling them in information-theoretic terms. We will formally define a threshold scheme within this context.
A. Introduction to Information Theory
We provide a short introduction to entropy here, but refer the reader to, for example, [8] for details.
For ease of translation from sets to random variables, throughout this paper we adopt the following conventions: if and are finite sets then we simplify to and the singleton set to (hence, represents the set , etc.).
Let be a finite set. Let be a finite collection of tuples, such that the entries of a tuple are indexed by the elements of . Let be a probability distribution on . For and , let and let . Let be the marginal distribution on , that is, is the probability distribution on such that for we have
Let
. We use the notation to denote the set of tuples indexed by with the associated probability distribution . 
B. Threshold Schemes
Let be a set of participants, let be the secret, and let be an integer with .
Definition 1:
A -threshold scheme is a probability distribution defined on a collection of tuples , each of which is indexed by the elements of , such that for if if .
We call the elements of distribution rules. Note that these are the tuples of that occur with nonzero probability. In order to implement a threshold scheme, the collection of distribution rules is made public. A dealer privately selects a distribution rule with probability , then securely distributes as a share to , for . The element is the secret, and is kept private. We call the size of the share associated with participant , and the size of the secret. It can be seen (for example, [20] ) that in any threshold scheme . If for all such then we say that the threshold scheme is ideal. Ideal -threshold schemes can be found for all integers . We describe two examples that are used in Section VIII.
Example 2 (Shamir [17] ): Let , let be a prime, and let be the field of integers modulo . Suppose is an integer with . A dealer generates distinct, nonzero elements of and publishes them. The dealer then secretly and randomly chooses elements and forms the polynomial For , the share is issued to participant and the value of the secret is . It is straightforward to verify that any participants can determine by polynomial interpolation, but any participants can obtain no information about the value of , additional to the fact that it is in . In this case, there are distribution rules in , corresponding to the values of the -tuple . Since is uniform, we have that and thus that the scheme is ideal.
Example 3: An equivalent way to construct an ideal -threshold scheme uses a geometric construction in PG (for a background in projective geometry see [11] ). Let be a mapping that assigns to each participant as share a point on a normal rational curve in and assigns the secret to be a further point on this curve. If participants pool their shares, these shares span and so they can obtain the secret. If participants pool their shares, these shares span a -dimensional subspace which contains no further point of the normal rational curve, so in particular does not contain . They thus have no information about the secret . To see how to extract the distribution rules of an ideal -threshold scheme from this configuration of points see, for example, [13] or [20] .
C. Restrictions and Contractions
In order to define our model rigorously, we will make use of two types of threshold schemes that can be derived from an existing threshold scheme. The restriction of a -threshold scheme to a subset of participants is the -threshold scheme that results from effectively discarding the shares held by the other participants. The contraction of a -threshold scheme at a set of shares is the -threshold scheme that results from effectively broadcasting this set of shares.
More generally, let be a probability distribution on a finite collection of tuples indexed by the finite set . For , the restriction to of the pair is the pair . For and , the contraction at of the pair is the pair . Restrictions and contractions of threshold schemes are formalised by the following two results from [12] . [12] Let be a -threshold scheme and let . Then is a -threshold scheme, known as the restriction of to .
Theorem 4 (Restriction):
Theorem 5 (Contraction): [12] Let be a -threshold scheme. Let , let and let . Then is a -threshold scheme, known as the contraction of at .
III. DYNAMIC THRESHOLD SCHEMES
In this paper, we are interested in threshold schemes where the parameters can later be changed by means of a public channel broadcast. In this section, we first comment on the special case of enrollment. We then propose a simple extension of the model of a threshold scheme within which to analyze dynamic threshold schemes.
A. Enrollment
There is one type of parameter change that cannot be easily accommodated in the communication network environment that we propose. Enrollment of new participants who were not issued with any private information at system setup is impossible in a broadcast-only network. The reason for this is that each new participant needs to acquire some private information from the dealer, which clearly needs the involvement at some stage of a secure distribution channel. The only ways in which enrollment could be performed are as follows.
• A secure channel is set up between the dealer and any new enrolling participants to issue them with shares.
• All possible future participants are issued with a cryptographic key at system setup. These participants are then effectively "sleeping participants" until the time of enrollment, when the dealer broadcasts their share to them, encrypted under the key that they were issued at setup. This is essentially the same technique used in [18] to remotely activate threshold schemes.
• Existing participants transfer necessary information using secure channels to new enrolling participants (this is outside our communications model, but is appropriate in the redistribution environments mentioned in Section I).
For this reason, we do not consider enrollment in the rest of this paper, and acknowledge that if enrollment is required then secure channels must be established using one of the above techniques.
B. A Model for Dynamic Threshold Schemes
Let be a set of participants and be a secret. Let be a collection of threshold structures defined on subsets of (in other words, for each there exist , , and such that is a -threshold structure defined on ). We wish to establish a -threshold scheme defined on that has the capability of being changed by means of a broadcast message into a scheme with threshold structure , where can be any of the threshold structures in . We denote the secret after this change by . We will also make the reasonable assumption throughout that (6) Each is associated with a broadcast variable , which represents the broadcast message that the dealer will send if he wishes to change to the threshold structure . We let In other words, is initially a -threshold scheme. If the broadcast message is sent on a public channel then knowledge of the original shares and this broadcast result in also becoming a -threshold scheme defined on . Note that in Definition 6 we do not care whether a set of participants belonging to can obtain prior to knowledge of the broadcast . It is foreseen that in most anticipated applications that will not have any relevant meaning until the point at which the dealer initiates a parameter change (for example, may be the backup master key that the dealer will only activate in the event that a parameter change is necessary).
We are interested first in minimizing the size of shares held by each participant, which is measured by . We are then interested in minimizing the size of the broadcast , which is measured by . In this paper, for a number of different sets , we will determine the minimal size of broadcast necessary in a share minimal threshold scheme that can be updated to . Whereas lower bounds on share size are easily extracted from existing work and tend to be "expected," lower bounds on broadcast size are neither established nor particularly intuitive. For example, it would seem intuitive that broadcast size should depend on the set , and that larger sets will require larger broadcasts, but we prove the slightly surprising result that the minimal broadcast size is "fairly independent" of . We proceed by identifying some "sensible" sets to study. First, observe that if a lower bound holds for updating to then it also holds for updating to any region . We thus identify some meaningful "large" regions to investigate, and in Section VII-B will show that updating to "smaller" regions generally does not result in smaller broadcast sizes.
The three main regions that we study are as follows.
1) Threshold increases. The dealer wants it to be possible to change to any threshold structure with a greater threshold parameter. In other words, all -threshold structures with and . We denote this set by , or when no ambiguity arises.
2) Threshold decreases. The dealer wants it to be possible to change to any threshold structure with a smaller threshold parameter. In other words, all -threshold structures with and . We denote this set by , or simply . For reasons that will later be explained, we partition into (corresponding to ) and (corresponding to ).
3) The general case. The dealer wants it to be possible to change to any -threshold structure with . We denote this set by , or simply . Clearly, .
An example of a smaller region of interest is where and (this corresponds to disenrollments). We return to this is Section VII-B. The listed regions are illustrated in Fig. 1 .
A natural question to ask is: What is the relation between and ? We show in the next section that if (region ) or if ( and) (region ) then and are necessarily independent (Lemma 8). In the remaining case (region ), we can have . This is discussed in Section VI-A.
In the following sections we look at these different regions in turn and determine lower bounds on the broadcast size for updating to them. In Section V, we look at , in Section VI, we look at , and in Section VII, we look at and discuss the possibility of improving these results for smaller update regions. We begin with some preliminary results.
IV. PRELIMINARY RESULTS FOR DYNAMIC
THRESHOLD SCHEMES Let be a -threshold scheme with that can be updated to , some collection of -threshold structures with
. (The case is considered in Section VI-A and will not be considered further in this paper.) Let be the threshold structure on . We first prove three lemmas that we will need later. The first lemma notes that for a large class of regions the secrets and must be independent. Note that in the region , it is possible to have and . This is discussed in Section VI-A. The next observation is an adaptation of a result in [6] . (4) by (1) as and by (4) by (1) as as and by (4) The complete proof of this theorem is complex, see Appendix I-A for full details. We sketch the proof here to provide an idea of how it works. Theorem 12 is proved by induction on . We first prove the result for , that is, is an threshold scheme and . We derive two parts from , one part relating to and the other relating to . We then find entropy results concerning the participants, the broadcasts, and (see Lemmas 19 and 20 in Appendix I-A). Using these results, we can prove the size of the broadcast for (see Lemma 21 in Appendix I-A). To prove the result for general , we assume that , we contract on a subset of to obtain a threshold scheme that can be updated to for an appropriate choice of broadcast. Now we apply the result for the case and Theorem 12 follows.
We will see in Section VIII that this bound is tight when we demonstrate a share minimal scheme that also has minimal broadcast size.
Recall that, as discussed immediately after Definition 6, our model is not concerned with whether participants belonging to can obtain prior to knowledge of the broadcast . It is worth observing that if the model is restricted to make the extra requirement that they cannot obtain , we get the simplified bound .
VI. DECREASING THE THRESHOLD
In this section, we consider decreasing the threshold. We wish to establish a lower bound on the broadcast size necessary for a share minimal -threshold scheme that can be updated to . This case is interesting because there are a number of parameter sets within this region that any standard threshold scheme can be updated to, without the need for extra share information on scheme initialization. This partitions into two separate regions and , with corresponding to all pairs where , and corresponds to all pairs where . We will first discuss a special case arising as a result of this issue and then deal with the two separate regions.
A. A Special Case: Region
The region is interesting because here and can be equal. It is possible to update any standard -threshold scheme to a -threshold scheme in by broadcasting some selected share information that allows remaining participants to continue using their original shares within a new scheme. A simple example would be the fact that broadcasting the share held by any participant effectively converts the original scheme into a -threshold scheme, with that participant "removed." In such schemes there is no need to distribute extra share information and so . However, the region is otherwise artificial and providing the general capability of decreasing the threshold normally involves the inclusion of pairs outside this region, except in one significant case. When , we have and . This special case was studied in [1] , where it was shown that for schemes with the minimal share size of , the minimal broadcast size is
We refer the reader to [1] for details, and for examples of schemes with this minimal broadcast size.
B. Decreasing the Threshold When
For the rest of this section we thus only consider the case . We first establish that in contrast to the special case , when the size of shares in a -threshold scheme that can be updated to is at least .
Theorem 13:
Let be a -threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then . Proof: Let be a -threshold structure on ( exists as ). Noting that , choose to be a set of size and to be a set of size disjoint from . Now let . The TABLE I SHARE AND BROADCAST BOUNDS FOR UPDATING TO SOME SMALLER REGIONS U sets , , satisfy the conditions of Lemma 9, so we have by (6) .
As in Section V, we refer to a scheme with the minimal share size of for all as share minimal. The main result of this section is the following.
Theorem 14:
Let be a share minimal -threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then for any , where is a -threshold structure if if .
The complete proofs are in Appendix I-B, but we comment on them here. We have already seen that the two regions and are in some respects fundamentally different. In fact, to prove a lower bound on the broadcast size for updating to we need two different approaches for each of these two regions. The method of proof for the region is similar to that of Theorem 12. The proof for the region involves the following series of steps. The first step is to show that, for with , and that for any , . This is proved by induction on . The next step is to prove that if is a threshold structure in . The final step is to prove the result for by using induction on .
VII. UPDATING TO OTHER REGIONS
We have demonstrated lower bounds on the broadcast size of share minimal threshold schemes that can be updated to have lower, or higher threshold parameters. In this section, we briefly consider the general case, where the threshold can be either increased or decreased, and then discuss updating to smaller regions.
A. Updating the Threshold to
By Theorems 11 and 13, it follows that any -threshold scheme with that can be updated to has for all . The following is immediate from Theorems 12 and 14. We show in Section VIII that this lower bound is tight by providing a scheme that meets it.
B. Updating to Smaller Regions
We have already established results for updating to the regions , , and . Recall that, as remarked in Section III-B, it is possible that these bounds can be reduced if we only want to update to smaller regions.
The main problem with studying smaller regions is simply that it is not obvious which smaller regions might be of interest in genuine applications. Table I gives some examples of "sensible" smaller regions . In general, they show that so long as the update region is reasonably large then it is not possible to have a share minimal -threshold scheme that can be updated to using a smaller broadcast message than the bound of Theorem 15. The proofs of most of these bounds are not provided here as they can either be derived from the proofs of results in previous sections, or can be derived in a similar manner.
A few of these cases, however, do deserve special mention. Case 1 corresponds to the sequential disenrollment schemes studied in [2] , [4] , [15] . In this case, considering only one disenrollment, because only one participant will ever be removed from the scheme it is possible to have a small broadcast size. Case 5 ( ) and Case 6 are of interest because the conditions for Lemmas 7 and 9 do not apply. In these cases, it is possible to design schemes for updating to where and for all . The broadcast bound indicated in Table I is only one less than that of Theorem 15, and only when . These cases, and proofs of their broadcast bounds, are given in [1] (see also Section VI-A).
VIII. CONSTRUCTIONS
We now demonstrate that the bound on the broadcast size of Theorem 15 (and thus also the bounds of Theorems 12 and 14) is tight by constructing a share-minimal -threshold scheme with that can be updated to with the minimal broadcast size indicated by Theorem 15.
We first indicate the idea behind the construction by demonstrating an extended version of the Shamir threshold scheme (recall that Example 2 meets the broadcast bound in some, but not all, cases). We then present a construction based on Example 3 that meets the bound of Theorem 15 in all cases. Construction 16 only meets the bound of Theorem 15 for some parameters. We now give a general geometric construction based on Example 3 that meets the bound in all cases.
Construction 17: (Using a Geometrical Scheme):
The scheme is divided into three phases.
Initialization: The dealer issues each participant in with a share in each of two geometric threshold schemes, defined as follows.
1) Let be a set of "imaginary" participants. Denote and let be a geometric -threshold scheme. 2) Let be a set of "imaginary" participants. Denote PG and let be a geometric -threshold scheme. The two shares held by each participant can be represented as a single subspace by embedding and as disjoint subspaces in PG and considering the share of participant to be the subspace of . Before update: Participants can use their shares of to realize a -threshold scheme. Update: Suppose that we wish the scheme to be updated to , a -threshold structure on . In order to activate , the dealer has two options.
1) Define subspaces and of . In order to activate , the dealer broadcasts the subspace by choosing a suitable set of points of . As , we have
If a set of participants in pool their shares, then is a subspace of dimension of which, by the properties of a normal rational curve, is disjoint from and hence . Thus, and together span , which contains , so the participants in can obtain the secret .
For a set of participants we consider the set . As , it follows that . The set is generated by points of the normal rational curve, hence, By the properties of a normal rational curve, does not contain any further point of the normal rational curve, so in particular, does not contain . This implies that a maximal unauthorized -set together with the participants and broadcast cannot obtain . The result of the broadcast is thus a -threshold scheme on . We refer to this construction process as updating with . If then . If then . So, updating with achieves the bound of Theorem 15 in the following cases: a)
; b) and . 2) For the remaining case, that is, and , we describe a similar process referred to as updating with . Although we show this for all , it is only optimal for . Define subspaces and of . In order to activate , the dealer broadcasts the subspace , where
and also a point on the line in , where . This gives a -threshold scheme on with secret and with broadcast satisfying
Thus, for the case and , updating with meets the bound of Theorem 15.
Hence, we have shown that the bound in Theorem 15 can always be met by either updating with or updating with . Note also that if we wanted to make the assumption that the participants cannot determine before the broadcast then we would need to be an -threshold scheme, in which case we would have if and otherwise. We now give an example to illustrate and compare Constructions 16 and 17.
Example 18: Suppose we start with , a -threshold scheme on , and we want to update to , a -threshold scheme on . We will show how to update using both Constructions 16 and 17 and show that Construction 17 results in a smaller broadcast size than Construction 16. Note that is in the region and so we will use the first update option described in each construction.
We will work over GF , a large odd prime. We begin with the polynomial Construction 16. Let and note that Scheme I is a -threshold scheme on and Scheme II is a -threshold scheme on . Suppose Scheme I has associated polynomial and Scheme II has associated polynomial Suppose the public values for are , , , , and , and so their shares are , respectively. To perform the update to as in Construction 16, we need to broadcast three pieces of information, namely, , , and . This would enable an authorized set in to obtain by completely determining all the coefficients of . We can think of this polynomial Scheme II as a geometric construction in PG as follows. We can represent 's information in Scheme II as
In the geometric interpretation, we think of as a point in PG associated with participant . Thus, each participant is associated with a point on a normal rational curve as described in Example 3. (A similar interpretation applies for Scheme I.) Thus, by using this geometric interpretation, we can illustrate how to update from the polynomial to using Construction 17. Using the same notation as in the construction, let be a geometric -threshold scheme on (such that corresponds to the polynomial using the above interpretation). Let . This, subspace is represented by the matrix equation where We note that the connection between the polynomial scheme and the geometrical scheme is through the matrix . In the polynomial scheme, if we know , we know all linear combinations of the equations represented by . In the geometric interpretation, this corresponds to the following: if we know the points represented by , then we know all the linear combinations of these points, that is, we know the subspace generated by these points. Thus, the geometrical scheme is a straightforward generalization of the polynomial scheme. Note that in the polynomial scheme, broadcast information is limited to points on the polynomial. However, in the geometric scheme, the broadcast information is more flexible (which is why we can obtain smaller broadcasts). In the geometric scheme, broadcast information is not limited to points on the normal rational curve, we can broadcast any point in PG
. We now verify that authorized sets can obtain the secret . The authorized set knows the following matrix equation whose four rows correspond to and 's shares, and the broadcast values and To show that can be calculated, we apply row operations to show that the vector is in the row space of the left-hand matrix. This is so since the row reduced form of that matrix is Similarly, for the remaining authorized sets and . We do not need to check the unauthorized sets as the span of any four points on the normal rational curve does not contain any further point of the normal rational curve, so does not contain .
Hence, using Construction 17, we only need to broadcast two pieces of information compared to three pieces for Construction 16. Note that with Construction 16, authorized sets have enough information to determine the entire polynomial . However, with Construction 17, although authorized sets have enough information to determine , they do not necessarily have enough information to determine .
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have established the minimal broadcast necessary to update the parameters of a share-minimal threshold scheme, and demonstrated an optimal scheme for achieving these bounds. We showed these results for achieving one parameter update. A natural question to consider is the situation where we want more than one, say two updates. If on is updated to on (using ), then updated to on (using ), we would need . So we would need to add the extra condition if if .
The next step would be to investigate the independence of the secrets , , and . Under what circumstances would it hold that ? Third, for which access structures and update collections (containing ) and (containing ) do we need to have ? Fourth, we would expect the same bounds for as for and so we could extend Construction 17 in Section VIII by having an extra imaginary participants in schemes and , and having a third scheme , a geometric threshold scheme.
Another interesting generalization is to consider threshold schemes that are not share-minimal. In such schemes, it is possible to reduce the broadcast size at the expense of an increase in the amount of information stored as shares. As mentioned in Section I, the extreme case of this concession is to give participants one share for every possible new threshold parameter set and then simply broadcast a message indicating which new set of shares to move to in order to enable the new parameter change. The pattern of the intermediate tradeoffs between this extreme case and the share-minimal schemes discussed in this paper remains undetermined and would be worthy of further investigation.
APPENDIX PROOFS OF MAIN THEOREMS
A. Proof for Theorem 12
We proceed to prove this result by induction, commencing with the case and then the general case. Increasing the Threshold: The Case : We aim to prove the lower bound on the broadcast size for the case . We first prove two technical lemmas and then establish the bound for this case.
Let and be a share-minimal -threshold scheme that can be updated to . Let be a -threshold structure on . By share minimality we have for each . Essentially, one part of each share can be thought of as relating to the original -threshold structure and the other part can be thought of as relating to the new threshold structure
. To see this, we factor out the first part by letting and defining a new probability distribution on by . The following lemma shows that is "almost" a -threshold scheme. . By (7) and (9) it follows that , as required. For part d), let and choose . Since for all , by (8) and (9) it follows that , as required. Finally, for part b), apply Lemma 10 to parts c) and d) to obtain , the equality by a). As it follows that for all .
We now prove some further properties of before establishing the bound. Hence equality holds throughout.
We can now prove the lower bound on the size of broadcast for the case . Finally, we note that if the model is restricted to include the extra requirement that the participants belonging to cannot obtain prior to knowledge of the broadcast (in other words, ) then it follows that and from (10) we get the simplified bound of instead of the bound in Theorem 12.
B. Proof for Theorem 14
We have already seen that the two regions and are in some respects fundamentally different. In fact, to prove a lower bound on the broadcast size for updating to we need two different approaches for each of these two regions. We prove these results separately in Theorems 23 and 24. The bound in Theorem 14 then follows immediately.
Decreasing the Threshold: Updating to : Recall that our aim is to establish a bound for updating to . In this subsection, we consider schemes for updating to but will only be concerned with how big the broadcast size is in the case that the new threshold parameters belong to . We proceed by induction on the new threshold parameter, first proving the bound for updating to and then for updating to general .
Lemma 22: Let be a share minimal -threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then for any -threshold structure defined on , . Proof: Let be a -threshold structure on . Since we have . Let be a set of size , let be a set of size disjoint from and let . As in the proof of Theorem 13, , , and satisfy the conditions of Lemma 9. As and , equality holds throughout the proof of Lemma 9. In particular (11) (12) (13) It follows from (13) that and are independent.
For each , define a new probability distribution on by . From (13) it follows that and so (14) Also by (13) , and so (see Section II-A). Since we have and thus
. By Lemma 10, it follows that and hence, . By (11) and (14) (16) and so by (14) 
By (12), and by (13), . Now Thus, (19) Thus, by (18) by (17) Decreasing the Threshold: Updating to : We now prove the complementary result to Theorem 23. Thus, we consider schemes for updating to but will only be concerned with how big the broadcast size is in the case that the new threshold parameters belong to .
Theorem 24: Let be a share minimal -threshold scheme with that can be updated to . Then, for any , where is a -threshold structure, we have Proof: We divide the proof into three steps. In Step 1, we prove that for (20) In Step 2, for as in the theorem and with a -threshold structure (so ), we will prove that (21)
In Step 3, we complete the proof of the theorem.
We begin our proof. We note that since can be updated to , (16) 
We now prove (20 
Combining (28) and (29) Now if then . Otherwise, and, as , . Thus, , proving (21).
Step 3. We now let be a -threshold structure. If the result follows by (21). Suppose . We proceed in a similar manner as in the proof of Theorem 23. Let be a -set and let . Let probability distribution on be defined by . It can be shown that is a share minimal -threshold scheme which can be updated to with . For where is -threshold on , the broadcast is where is the access structure on . Hence, is the broadcast in for , where is the -threshold structure on . By (21) we have Now so , proving the theorem.
The bound in Theorem 14 now follows immediately from Theorems 23 and 24.
